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Sweden and Denmark are widely regarded as similar countries culturally and politically, 
especially as beacons of the Scandinavian-style welfare state model. Prior to the Syrian 
refugee crisis in Europe, the two countries also had relatively similar refugee policies and 
integration programs. However, in response to the crisis, Sweden and Denmark have 
adopted vastly different refugee policies. This thesis argues that the effects of national 
identity on Swedish and Danish welfare state policy are similar to national identity’s 
effects on their refugee policy but that a moral distinction between the two regarding 
honoring rights claims from non-nationals results in different refugee policy outcomes. 
Swedish national identity has integrated liberal universalist values, resulting in 
inclusionary refugee policy, whereas Danish national identity favors nationalist values, 
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 The United Nations’ 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees comprise the foundation of international 
refugee law. Refugees are, according to this definition, those individuals who are forced 
to flee their home countries owing to the “well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.”1 Refugees are thus specified as a unique category of human rights victims – 
unable to make human rights claims within their home countries and requiring 
international protection – who should be accorded special protection and benefits in the 
states that receive them.2  
 Under the protection of this convention, authorities in receiving countries cannot 
compel refugees to return home if to do so would place them in further danger (a 
principle called “nonrefoulement”), and refugees have a right to apply for asylum and 
secure their refugee status within the receiving nations. Furthermore, the convention 
affirms that refugees should be treated fairly by host states and be given assistance to 
help sustain them initially. However, international law provides only the minimum 
standard of what should be offered – it is the individual host state’s prerogative to 
determine the level and type of assistance that they will give.3 This thesis explores the 
specific policy reactions of two states – Sweden and Denmark – to the Syrian refugee 
                                                
1 United Nations General Assembly, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 
July 1951, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 189, p. 137. Available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3be01b964.html. 
2 Gil Loescher, introduction to Refugees in International Relations ed. Gil Loescher and 
Laila Monahan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 8. 
3 Ibid., 9 
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crisis and examines the role that national identity has played in making refugee policy 
choices.  
 Chapter 1 explains the shared history of these two countries regarding refugee 
policy and asks why the two have diverged in reaction to the contemporary refugee crisis 
in Europe. The second chapter lays out the theoretical framework of the thesis. It explores 
liberal univeralism and nationalism, the theories of duties to nationals versus non-
nationals that manifest differently in Swedish versus Danish refugee policy-making.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 detail Swedish and Danish refugee policies prior to and 
following the effects of the Syrian refugee crisis in Europe. In Chapter 3, the explanation 
of Swedish refugee policy is followed by an examination of Swedish national identity – 
which I argue is influenced by liberal universalist values – and its effects on refugee 
policy. Chapter 4 then turns to Danish refugee policy changes, and examines Danish 
national identity and its effects on Danish refugee policy. Chapter 5 serves as a final 












Chapter 1 – Brief Background and Research Question 
 
I. Overview of Swedish and Danish Cases 
 The international community has generally regarded Sweden and Denmark as 
extremely similar nations, applying the “Scandinavian” or “Nordic” monolith to them and 
their neighbors, Norway and Finland. Though on the periphery of Europe, they have been 
central to the international perception of Scandinavia, representing the older 
Scandinavian nation-states in terms of national independence.4 5 Their histories as 
prominent Protestant nations, their mutually intelligible languages, and even their flags – 
exactly the same but for the color scheme – contribute to an international perception of 
uniformity. Most notably, both are considered beacons of the successful Scandinavian 
socialist welfare state model.6  
 In the realm of refugee protection, both Sweden and Denmark have similarly long 
traditions of not only participating in, but being at the forefront of, international refugee 
protection. Denmark was the first country to ratify the United Nations’ 1951 Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, and both were among the first to implement the 
                                                
4 Stephen Richards Graubard, Norden: The Passion for Equality (New York: Norwegian 
University Press, 1986), 87. 
5 Erik Jørgen Hansen, ed. Welfare Trends in the Scandinavian Countries (Armonk, N.Y: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1993), 6. 
6 Ana Powell “Scandinavian Responses to the Refugee Crisis: How Denmark and 




Convention and the 1967 Protocol,7 the foundational documents of international refugee 
law. Denmark and Sweden are both considered among the set of nine “traditional 
resettlement countries” that work closely with the United Nations’ High Commissioner 
for Refugees in solution-seeking on global refugee issues and provide comprehensive 
integration support to those seeking asylum within their borders.8 In 2013, Sweden 
ranked first and Denmark ranked seventh on the list of asylum-seekers received per 
capita among the nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD)9, attracting asylum-seekers with their strong welfare states and 
integration policies. Their resettlement and integration efforts have historically been 
backed by a general acknowledgement in each that resettlement is a vital tool for 
international refugee protection, a key instrument in seeking durable solutions to 
refugees’ problems, and helps to share responsibility internationally.10 
 The wider Nordic region (Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Norway) has offered 
generous integration programs to refugees, exceeding the minimum standards of duties 
prescribed in the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. Integration programs in the region 
include the provision of free language training, cultural programs, vocational training and 
other courses aimed at cultural integration. Refugees also have access to state-funded 
education and healthcare systems, and numerous nongovernmental organizations provide 
                                                
7 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, States Parties to the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, United Nations, 
Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf 
8 Mette Honoré, “Resettlement in the Nordic Countries,” The Online Journal of the 
Migration Policy Institute (September 1, 2003): 1. 
9 George Arnett “Sweden – the OECD’s Highest Per Capita Recipient of Asylum-
seekers” The Guardian, December 2, 2014, https://perma.cc/HF99-39HA 
10 Honoré, “Resettlement in the Nordic Countries,” 2 
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additional reception, integration, and counseling functions in tandem with national and 
local governments.11 
 The refugee flows from Syria have tested these asylum and integration programs. 
The Syrian refugee crisis, which began in 2013 and continues presently, has had a 
profound impact on refugee policy in both countries; yet despite their shared progressive 
history concerning refugee policy and the similar problems that the crisis has imposed on 
the two, Sweden and Denmark have diverged dramatically over contemporary refugee 
issues.  
 Initial Swedish reactions to the crisis were to grant all Syrians temporary 
residency as asylum-seekers and to raise taxes on native Swedes by approximately 7 
billion kronor to support the newcomers, who would receive the same state benefits as 
native Swedes. Conversely, Denmark gained a reputation as one of the most inhospitable 
European countries for Syrians seeking asylum and actively discouraged refugees from 
settling there by cutting welfare benefits and increasing bureaucratic hurdles to gaining 
residency status.12 
 
II. Research Question 
 This thesis seeks to answer one central question: why have Sweden and Denmark, 
countries with shared progressive histories in international refugee protection, taken such 
different approaches to refugee policy in the wake of the Syrian crisis? The disparity in 
refugee acceptance and integration between Denmark and Sweden has created a 
                                                
11 Ibid., 3 
12 Powell, “Scandinavian Responses to the Refugee Crisis: How Denmark and Sweden 
Differ in Their Approaches.” 
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knowledge gap as to why two otherwise similar nations would adopt different policies 
when experiencing the same refugee crisis.   
 This work provides a synthesis and analysis of existing literature on modern 
Swedish and Danish refugee policy, ethics in policy-making and refugee policy, and the 
different cultural and moral structures of Danish and Swedish societies as a way to 
explain the aforementioned difference. There is vast literature on the way that Swedish 
and Danish national identity has impacted and been impacted by their strong welfare 
states, yet very little regarding of their refugee policies and integration programs.13  This 
is a study of how national identity manifests in current refugee policy in Denmark and 
Sweden.  
 I argue that national identity affects Swedish and Danish refugee policy in a 
similar fashion to how it affects welfare policy, and that the moral underpinnings of each 
country’s national identity vary in how they morally prioritize duties to nationals versus 
non-nationals. Swedish national identity includes a dedication to liberal universalist, 
humanitarian values, which influence inclusive refugee policy-making. In the Swedish 
case, national pride is bolstered when humanitarian goals, such as accepting and aiding 
refugees, are met. Danish national identity has not centered liberal universalism, but 
nationalist values that prioritize rights of nationals over those of non-nationals and 
contributing to exclusionary refugee policies. In contrast to the Swedish case, Danes do 
not perceive their national identity as affirmed by accepting refugees, but instead 
perceive a threat in the huge influx of culturally dissimilar Syrian refugees. Danish 
                                                
13 See: Robert Erikson, The Scandinavian Model: Welfare States and Welfare Research; 
Erik Jørgen Hansen, ed. Welfare Trends in the Scandinavian Countries; Muriel Nissel, 
The Welfare State: Diversity and Decentralisation; Markus M. L. Crepaz, Trust beyond 
Borders: Migration, the Welfare state, and Identity in Modern Societies. 
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refugee policy in reaction to the Syrian crisis follows a trend of growing nationalism in 
the country and in Europe, as signaled by the shift in Danish elections since 2001 that has 
elevated more conservative and anti-immigration parties and advanced their agendas. 
 
III. Contributions and Implications of this Work 
 Examining the development of Danish and Swedish national identities and their 
relation to refugee law will provide valuable insight into the asylum and integration 
policies of these two nations. A comparative study of the two is useful, not only in 
identifying the similarities and differences between the ways they each justify their 
integration policies, but also in identifying the factors that explain why the two have 
sought different solutions to similar challenges. The thesis thus helps to fill this 
knowledge gap concerning the contemporary refugee crisis and differing policy reactions 
to Syrian refugees within Scandinavia and Europe at large. Further, this research could 
inform other broader analyses as to the motivations behind inclusive or exclusive refugee 
policy globally by considering national identity has an important factor in policy-making. 
The work demonstrates how the moral beliefs that justify welfare states’ generous 
domestic policy-making can be used to justify refugee policy-making – either by 





Chapter Two – Theoretical Framework 
 
I. Introduction 
 This chapter serves as an introduction to the two sets of values that this thesis 
focuses on when analyzing refugee policy in Sweden and Denmark: liberal universalism 
and nationalism. Their relevance to refugee policy is first explained and contextualized in 
the Swedish and Danish cases. Each value set is then analyzed individually - liberal 
universalism’s prevalence in international human rights and refugee law is explained, 
while nationalism’s relevance to domestic refugee policy is further explored.  
 The final section of the chapter describes the ways in which the international 
community and individual states implement policies with liberal universalist or 
nationalist values, balancing the two to suit their interests. This section draws on several 
European examples and reconnects the moral discussion to the Swedish and Danish 
cases, to be elaborated upon further in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
II. Ethics in Refugee Policy 
 Refugee rights are currently framed within two sets of values that justify refugee 
policy-making: liberal universalist values and nationalist values.14 The current 
international refugee law regime embraces liberal universalist values, but individual 
nations enact a variety of inclusionary or exclusionary policies motived by some balance 
of these value sets according to their political interests. Though they conflict, these value 
                                                
14 Christina Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, Ethics and Global Politics 
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 15. 
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sets are not mutually exclusive; countries implementing refugee policy must balance their 
international humanitarian interests and national interests when enacting refugee policy.15  
 When evaluating the policy choices of Sweden and Denmark, a divide between 
liberal universalist and nationalist values can be seen in both policies and rhetoric. 
Liberal universalist policies are inclusive – they grant that refugees have a valid claim to 
rights within a country, and include measures to accept asylum-seekers and sufficiently 
integrate them into the host society. These are the values that characterize Sweden’s 
policy reactions to the crisis, whereas Denmark’s policies have followed a trend of 
nationalist exclusion. Exclusionary policies toward refugees, such as policies or actions 
that restrict access to state resources or attempt to deter refugees from applying for 
asylum in the first place, are generally motivated by nationalist values that prioritize 
national interest over international obligations.  
 Liberal universalist policies can be motivated by nationalist values, if national 
identity is in part rooted in a commitment to liberal universalist goals, as I will argue is 
the case in Sweden. There are, however, instances where restrictive policy has been 
enacted, yet framed within liberal universalist and utilitarian rhetoric about European 
burden-sharing and regional solidarity.  
 
III. Liberal Universalist Values and Humanitarianism 
 Liberal universalist values are those that give equal moral weight to the rights and 
welfare of all individuals, regardless of membership in any certain social group. With 
regards to nationality, universalism holds that the only morally relevant features of 
                                                
15 Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan, eds., Refugees and International Relations, (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 3 
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individuals are those that are common to human beings in general, and thus nationality 
does not affect the weight of one’s moral claims.16 The modern iteration of liberal 
universalist values obligates states as rights protectors.17 
  The emergence of universal conceptions of personhood as dominant in 
international law was a major development of the post-war period, formalized by a 
multitude of international codes and laws that ascribed universal rights to individuals 
regardless of their citizenship. State signatories to international charters and conventions 
such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and, of course, the 
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and subsequent 1967 Protocol, were 
obligated to not make distinctions on the grounds of nationality regarding civil, social, 
and political rights.18 According to Soysal, universalist values come across most clearly 
in the case of refugees, whose membership status in host societies relies exclusively on 
an appeal to moral humanitarian values granting them individual rights.19 
 Liberal universalist values are integrated into refugee policy-making in various 
ways. Within a liberal universalist framework, the host society has no justification for 
privileging the rights of nationals over non-nationals, as there is no moral distinction 
between the two groups, and the host society has a duty to assist refugees. Restricting the 
influx of refugees or choosing not to assist them is thus not justified unless admission 
                                                
16 Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, 48 
17 Ibid., 20 
18 Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal, Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational 
Membership in Europe, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1994), 145. 
19 Ibid., 142 
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would infringe on the equally valid universal rights of fellow nationals. Proponents of 
refugee rights generally draw on universal rights to justify their policy claims. 20 
 More nuanced iterations of liberal universalism in refugee policy are impacted by 
consequentialist utilitarianism, which considers interest in happiness or wellbeing to be 
the most important characteristic of humans regarding rights claims. Like liberal 
universalism, it still does not give any special moral relevance to nationality but 
prioritizes the maximization of the wellbeing of all.21 Utilitarianism can thus be 
employed to expand and justify liberal universalist duties to non-nationals. In this vein, 
states can institute special measures to benefit the interests of refugees, given that to a 
certain point, the average refugee’s happiness will increase substantially more than any 
national citizen’s will decrease owing to the refugee’s presence in the country. 
 Consequentialist utilitarianism can be also used to justify rescinding liberal 
universalist policies. In line with liberal universalism, utilitarianism claims no moral 
justification for restricting refugees’ access to the state, but utilitarianism reaches a limit 
when admission of refugees would infringe upon the rights of nationals to an equivalent 
or greater degree as denying the refugee.22 Consequentialist utilitarianism provides moral 





                                                
20 Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, 49 
21 Ibid., 47 
22 Ibid., 49 
Brennen 12 
IV. Nationalist Values and Neo-nationalism 
 Nationalist values, in contrast to universalism, prioritize national interests over 
obligations to other groups.23 They are founded upon the idea of a nation – a community 
bound to a common territory, governed by a sovereign authority, with a shared history. 
This conception of a nation gives rise to the notion of defined national identity, a sense of 
shared characteristics and common purpose that bind the people of a certain territory 
together and connect them to a sovereign government. Though the rights of citizens are 
grounded in a universalist conception of equal rights24, they make a distinction between 
nationals and non-nationals as to whose rights the state is most obligated to protect.  
 The idea of a concrete national territory is “fundamental to the national 
imagination,” according to Skey, especially in relation to a linked past that is articulated 
in terms of a national history in that territory and the present national identity as 
“embodied through daily and mass ‘national’ rituals,” which contribute to ensuring a 
secure national future.25 These national rituals add a cultural dimension to nationalism, 
establishing systems that create social norms and values.26 Broadly, nationalism is tied to 
the nation as an “administrative territorial unit” with sovereignty and a socially shared 
belief system.27 
 Gingrich and Banks observe that in the 20th century, nationalist values have 
manifested in ‘neo-nationalism’, the reemergence of nationalism in response to new 
                                                
23 Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, 15. 
24 Ibid., 21. 
25 Michael Skey, National Belonging and Everyday Life: The Significance of Nationhood 
in an Uncertain World, (New York: Springer, 2011), 11. 
26 Ibid., 11. 
27 Mikael Hjerm and Annette Schnabel, “Mobilizing nationalistic sentiments: Which 
factors affect nationalist sentiments in Europe?,” Social Science Research 39, no. 4, 
(July, 2010), 528. 
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global and transnational issues.28 Neo-nationalism contrasts with old European 
nationalism by reframing national kinship rhetoric as metaphorical. Neo-nationalism sees 
the state as a ‘motherland’ or ‘fatherland’, or conceives of the state as one metaphorical 
family29, where old nationalism presented the nation as a literal family with a shared 
ancestry. The neo-nationalist ideology uses culture as the basis of kinship and reacts to 
the ‘threat’ of globalization as a threat against local culture. Neo-nationalist agendas thus 
favor strict state sanctions regarding immigrants, illegal aliens, or ethnic minorities.30 
  The importance of nationality and citizenship in political space relies upon the 
simultaneous existence of the ‘other’, the ‘foreigner’31, and other constructions of non-
members, non-nationals, who pose a threat to the cohesion of the nation-state. In 
nationalist terms, Gingrich sums it up nicely: “We know who ‘we’ are and what 
constitutes our sameness, precisely because we know who ‘we’ are not and what 
constitutes our difference from others.”32 These constructions of foreigners rely on the 
“reproduction of ideological narratives of national and cultural belonging, with their… 
definitions of inclusion and exclusion.”33 
 
 
                                                
28 André Gingrich and Marcus Banks, eds., Neo-Nationalism in Europe and Beyond: 
Perspectives from Social Anthropology, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 2. 
29 Ibid., 8. 
30 Ibid., 17-18. 
31 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations 106, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
57. 
32 Gingrich, Neo-Nationalism in Europe and Beyond, 9. 
33 Leila Simona Talani, ed., Globalisation, Migration, and the Future of Europe: Insiders 
and Outsiders, Routledge Research on the Global Politics of Migration, (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 13. 
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V. Brief History of Liberal Universalism, Nationalism, and Refugee Policy 
 In the early twentieth century, refugee policy was influenced by nationalist 
values, as a large number of refugees fled persecution or were casualties of state 
consolidation in the 1920s.34  At the time, there was no recognition of international legal 
duties to refugees, but international cooperation began on a temporary basis via the 
League of Nations’ efforts to assist refugees from Russia and the Caucasus. Under their 
mandate however, universalist values were not invoked – refugees were defined by their 
nationality or religion. There was no generally applicable concept of ‘refugee’ on an 
international basis. Refugee assistance during this period was more often tied to the labor 
needs of the receiving state and their security concerns, rather than a universalist or 
humanitarian sense of duty to the displaced.35  
 A sense of liberal universalism began to emerge in international refugee policy 
following World War II, when there was a shift from defining a refugee by their nation of 
origin to defining a refugee by their experience of persecution regardless of origin.36 This 
universalist shift in refugee policy mirrored the larger universalist turn in human rights 
policy regionally within Europe and globally.37 Liberal universalist values continued to 
be incorporated into the definition of ‘refugee’ and then further incorporated into 
international law and institutions to assist refugees. 
 The establishment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in 1950 marked a universalist shift in refugee policy-making – dedicating an 
international body to protecting refugees and affirming their right to protection regardless 
                                                
34 Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, 24. 
35 Ibid., 25. 
36 Ibid., 26. 
37 Soysal, Limits of Citizenship, 145. 
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of national origin or destination reflected universalist values. The UNHCR’s definition of 
refugee as one fleeing their country of origin “owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion”38 was based on a universalist theory of rights that regardless 
of group membership, one has a right to freedom from persecution. The UNHCR’s 
mandate was initially limited, but throughout the 1950s began to expand to cover refugee 
rights in developing countries outside of Europe, resulting in the 1967 Protocol that 
applied the formal definition of ‘refugee’ globally.39  
 Despite the universalist foundation of international refugee law, nationalist values 
began to take precedence regarding refugee policy in the 1970s and 1980s, when racial 
tensions and low labor demand in refugee-receiving countries prompted national 
legislative action to halt immigration flows into Europe. This decline prompted 
prospective economic migrants to apply for refugee status, despite not meeting the 
international legal definition, ultimately overwhelming European state bureaucracies with 
requests.40 When dealing with this decidedly mixed migration flow, determining real 
from ‘bogus’ requests for asylum created an administrative burden that forced states to 
reevaluate their liberal universalist obligations to international refugee protection and 
their nationalist concerns about immigration, economic success, and security.41  
 In the post-9/11 West, the figure of a culturally dissimilar asylum-seeking 
outsider is additionally “burdened with negative meanings which can easily become 
                                                
38 United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 1A. 
39 Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy, 28 
40 Ibid., 28 
41 Ibid., 29 
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complicated by and confused with the image of the ‘Islamic terrorist’.”42 The insider-
outside narrative that nationalist values rely upon in constructing identity is compounded 
by the general perception that outsiders pose a security risk to insider-states – a 
perception that has been exacerbated by radical Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe and the 
War on Terror. This risk, if perceived as valid by the refugee-receiving nations, can 
justify exclusionary refugee policy by claiming that refugees pose a significant physical 
threat to the country.43 In this way, refugees are criminalized by “nationalist tropes” that 
obscure the truth of their situation, lumping them into a broader category of ‘other’ that 
includes other criminalized groups such as undocumented economic migrants.44  
 
VI. Balancing Liberal Universalist and Nationalist Values in Policy-Making 
 The dichotomy between liberal universalist and nationalist values does not mean 
national law always reflects nationalist values. Though the value sets must be balanced, 
they are not a binary – implementation of nationalist value-based policy does not always 
constitute a moral failure and the implementation of liberal universalist-based policy does 
not render a nation morally superior.45 Nationalist values are considered in domestic 
policy by their very nature, but states may also opt to embrace liberal universalist 
sentiment in refugee policy. Liberal universalist values can also be incorporated into 
nationalist values such that national identity is affirmed by fulfilling humanitarian 
goals.46  
                                                
42 Talani, Globalisation, Migration, and the Future of Europe, 17. 
43 Ibid., 18. 
44 Ibid., 17. 
45 Boswell, The Ethics of Refugee Policy 157. 
46 Ibid., 150-151. 
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 Liberal universalist action by the state could be motivated by nationalist values in 
some cases as well. For example, a state considering enacting inclusionary refugee policy 
might be concerned about the effect on their economy. Information that welcoming 
refugees has had a net positive or neutral effect on host communities’ economies and 
wages47 could therefore incentivize a government to enact liberal universalist policy even 
if not motivated by the liberal universalist sentiment that non-nationals have an equal 
claim to rights as nationals. 
 However, liberal universalist values still provide the moral foundation of the 
current body of international human rights and refugee law, grounded in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1951 Convention Relation to the Status of Refugees 
and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. These documents’ application is 
not limited to persons from particular countries, but they hold that every individual 
regardless of membership in any particular social groups have a right to protection. 48 
 A tension between elevating humanitarian values and protecting nationalist values 
results in a national-level balancing act in implementing policy motivated by liberal 
universalism or nationalism. States face a dilemma in managing the bureaucratic burden 
of determining the authenticity of asylum requests. In addition, the admittance of 
refugees poses a perceived security threat, especially for states hosting Muslim refugees 
post-9/11. To sustain the universalist international institutional framework that responds 
to refugee problems, states must subordinate their immediate political interests to address 
                                                
47 Ana Swanson, “The big myth about refugees,” The Washington Post, September 10, 
2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2015/09/10/the-big-myth-about-
refugees/?utm_term=.7443f77b7f7f. 
48 United Nations, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees as amended by the 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
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humanitarian concerns. This can have domestic political costs and states may choose to 
enact restrictive policies to avoid the problems associated with refugee admittance.  
 These national political considerations affect the implementation of universalist 
international refugee law. International law states that refugees have the right to state 
assistance, and are shaped by the principle that refugees should enjoy the same rights as 
the receiving state’s citizens. In practice, however, it is the state’s prerogative as to how 
much assistance they will provide. States make the majority of decisions on asylum and 
the quality of care, and remain the “decisive actors in refugee affairs.”49 The universalist 
body of law attempts to set a minimum standard, but at the intra-state level there is little 
control.50  
 While liberal universalist values and nationalist values can be balanced and 
combined to implement refugee policies that advance international and national goals, in 
their purest forms they inherently conflict in a way that is difficult to overcome. Liberal 
universalism dictates that non-nationals, in this case refugees, be treated the same as 
nationals, while nationalism entitles nationals to certain rights that non-nationals are not 
entitled to. 
 Despite the possibility of striking a balance between liberal universalist and 
nationalist values, individual state policy-making since the 1970s and 1980s has favored 
nationalism. Countries who are party to the 1951 Convention, obligating them to assist 
refugees, have implemented policies aimed at deterring refugees from applying for 
                                                
49 Loescher, Refugees and International Relations, 19 
50 Ibid., 8  
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asylum in the first place, thus hoping to avoid their international obligations.51 This turn 
toward nationalist values began with the aforementioned concerns regarding racial 
tension and labor integration, and now includes concerns over societal heterogeneity, the 
war on terror and national security, and maintaining state sovereignty.52 Particularly in 
European countries and the West, there are a number of perceived threats and associated 
fears that foreigners who bring crime, poverty, and anti-Western sentiment will engulf 
refugee-receiving nations.53  
 The global trend has leaned toward policies motivated by nationalist values, yet 
some states have enacted policies motivated by the liberal universalism that underpins 
international refugee law. The European Union, though its individual Member States 
have varying refugee policies, has advocated for its Member States to support and 
integrate refugees via the 1999 Tampere Programme, the 2004 Hague Programme, and 
the 2004 Common Basic Principles for Immigrant Integration framework.54  This 
inclusive framework is complicated by the Dublin Regulation, which establishes the 
Member State responsible for evaluating the asylum application, normally the State 
where the asylum-seeker first entered the EU. This regulation, though designed to 
provide common standards across the EU and give asylum-seekers similar protections in 
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all EU Member States, has often increased bureaucratic pressure on southern Member 
States. As a result, asylum-seekers have received different treatment across Europe.55  
 Recognizing the heavy burden that certain Member States initially bore owing to 
the Dublin regulation, some Member States began to enact inclusionary policies in 
response to the Syrian refugee crisis.. Germany, which took in more than one million 
refugees in 2015, maintained its open-door approach to refugees throughout 2016 despite 
several terror attacks committed by extremists posing as refugees. Chancellor Merkel 
framed humanitarian action and inclusionary refugee policy as important to German 
national values of unity, cooperation, and openness. 56 Germany was not alone – Norway 
expanded integration services to include sexual education for refugees,57 Portugal more 
than doubled their relocation quota, and their Foreign Minister Silva stated that serving 
refugees was not about gaining capital, but about welcoming refugees per their 
“obligation under international law.”58  
 Sweden maintained one of the most open refugee policies in Europe throughout 
much of the crisis, initially granting blanket permanent residence status to all Syrian 
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asylum-seekers from late 2013 through 2015.59 This is but one of several inclusionary 
policies enacted, in addition to their extremely generous preexisting integration policies. 
Sweden maintained their open stance toward refugees, and when enacting exclusionary 
policies, used rhetoric implying liberal universalist and utilitarian sentiment behind the 
policy changes. Sweden’s initial policies and reactions to the crisis are further explored in 
the Chapter 3, followed by a discussion of the role Swedish national identity played in 
formulating and justifying these policies. 
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Chapter Three – Sweden 
 
I. Introduction 
 In reaction the Syrian refugee crisis, Sweden initially enacted inclusionary 
policies that reflected liberal universalism’s place in their national identity. This chapter 
provides a background on Swedish refugee policy and frames it within Swedish national 
identity and liberal universalism. Sections II, III, and IV detail the history, background, 
and policy changes that followed the Syrian crisis reaching Sweden. Section V describes 
the immediate policy reactions in terms of Swedish national identity and commitment to 
liberal universalism, while Section VI notes more recent legislative restrictions to refugee 
access to Sweden. Section VI continues, however, to contextualize these changes within 
liberal universalist and consequentialist utilitarian value systems, rather than nationalist 
reactions to refugee influxes. As a whole, the chapter provides a basis for comparing 
Swedish and Danish refugee policies and national identities. 
 
II. History of Swedish Refugee Policy 
 Prior to the 1950s, Sweden was not considered an important actor on refugee 
issues – they did not sign the League of Nations’ 1933 Convention Relating to the 
International Status of Refugees, nor were they a member of the International Refugee 
Organization.60 Only a small number of refugees arrived before 1933, and the first major 
refugee flows to the country occurred during the Second World War. The most notable 
refugee influx from this period occurred in 1944, when the Swedish government offered 
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asylum to approximately 7,500 Danish Jews. However, most refugees were not 
permanently resettled in Sweden, and instead returned to Denmark following the end of 
World War II.61   
 Sweden has been leader in the international refugee regime since the 1950s, when 
they signed the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and later, the 1967 
Protocol, which extended the Convention’s application to refugees globally. Their 
refugee acceptance and integration program was established in 1950, and policy has been 
developed and changed on an ad hoc basis since then.62 It is today considered one of the 
nine “traditional” resettlement countries – those countries that refugees tend to favor as a 
destination and that are relatively more receptive to refugees than others states. Sweden 
also works closely with the UNHCR to seek global solutions to refugee issues.63  
  About half of Sweden’s foreign-born population – approximately 16% of the 
population – originally arrived to the country as refugees or family of refugees. This is in 
part due to Sweden’s humanitarian reputation – between 2005-2014, Sweden had the 
largest share of humanitarian migrants in total migration flows of any OECD country.64 
In addition to unstructured refugee flows, Sweden receives refugees through the 
UNHCR’s quota program and the government continually negotiates to increase the 
number of quota refugees received. 
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 The central legislation on Swedish refugee policy is the Aliens Act, which 
adheres to the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol’s definition of refugees and offers 
asylum. The act also offers subsidiary protection for other asylum-seekers who do not 
qualify as Convention refugees, widening the definition to include those who fear the 
death penalty, torture, or indiscriminate violence.65 Sweden also adheres to the European 
Union’s Dublin Regulation, which states that refugees in Europe should apply for asylum 
in the first EU country they reach.66 
 Concerning integration, the cornerstone of Swedish integration policy is a two-
year program that includes language training, as well as civic orientation and activities 
aimed at labor market integration.67 The state has offered Swedish language courses to all 
immigrants, including refugees, since 1950.68 Asylum-seekers receive free housing and 
monetary support while their status is determined by the state.69 Newly arrived refugees 
granted residence are enrolled in a work integration program through the Swedish Public 
Employment Service (Arbetsförmedlingen), not the migration board nor a municipal 
council. Most aspects of integration are handled by the government office that handles 
these same requests for Swedish nationals, giving refugees the same treatment as 
nationals as soon as possible.70  
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 Arbetsförmedlingen supports and guides job seekers by providing training courses 
to explain the Swedish job market and employment customs. The office also works with 
potential employers to identify those who are willing to hire refugees and negotiate with 
those who are less ready. After securing a job, the service continues to assist refugees in 
order to ensure “sustainability of employment.”71 Policy initiatives to increase integration 
have worked to enhance transparency on refugees’ skills and temporarily lower the hiring 
cost by providing wage-subsidies to refugee-hiring employers, while other policies have 
focused on empowering refugees’ existing skills by streamlining the qualification 
recognition process.72 Refugees express their work expectations to a job advisor, who 
helps assess skill levels based on formal qualifications, employment history and relevant 
experience.73  
 Asylum-seekers can also request help in finding housing through the state-assisted 
settlement program. The state-run program conducts a cross-country housing search, in 
an effort to reduce the risks of overcrowding or de facto segregation. Asylum-seekers can 
also decide to locate their own housing and thus choose where they resettle.74 
 This integration model, while comprehensive, is not one-track-fits-all. The 
government has established different integration programs and courses for refugees with 
different goals: “Coming to Sweden,” “Having Influence in Sweden,” and “Growing Old 
in Sweden” are examples of units offered.75 These varying integration models recognize 
the range of refugees’ desires and serve to integrate them into Swedish society in a 
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mutually beneficial way. By acknowledging the different goals that refugees may have 
while living in Sweden, the integration model grants them individual agency and dignity. 
“I can help myself. I can work,” stated one Syrian refugee, Bilal, who hoped to reunite 
with his family within two months. “This is my goal, to make a new life in Sweden,” he 
said, emphasizing that he did not want to burden the system, but wanted to work within 
the integration model.76 This model is particularly generous in comparison to integration 
standards within Europe and globally – in some EU countries refugees may not receive 
any form of assistance, effectively cutting them off from society.77  
 The Swedish integration system does not rely on assimilation to Swedish culture 
as a marker of success. Rather, success is measured by the other ways a refugee 
integrates into society via attaining a job, speaking the language, and understanding the 
ways that their personal goals can be achieved within Sweden. This contrasts with Danish 
integration policy, to be detailed later, which measures success via cultural assimilation. 
In terms of integration and support, “Sweden is the best country for Syrians, and 
everyone knows it,” said one young Syrian refugee, who had proudly renamed himself 
Johannes.78 
 
III. Syrian Refugee Crisis in Sweden 
 The Syrian refugee crisis began to affect Sweden early, as its strong welfare state 
and integration programs have long attracted refugees. Legislation from 2013, when the 
impact of the crisis first began to be felt in the country, granted Syrian asylum-seekers 
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permanent residence automatically and attracted high numbers of Syrians to the country. 
However, 2015 was a landmark year for the country, as the number of asylum-seekers 
(approximately 163,000) was almost double the number for 2014. This was the highest 
per capita inflow of refugees to any OECD country that year. The relatively favorable 
labor market conditions and highly developed, longstanding integration policies in the 
country signaled that they were well-equipped to deal with the influx of asylum-
seekers.79  
 However, the migration authorities struggled to find sufficient housing and 
education opportunities to accommodate the asylum-seekers. The housing system 
struggled with delays and postponements, especially when attempting to address the 
needs of the approximately 71,000 asylum-seekers who are under 18.80 The crisis also 
stoked fear and tension in the country – concerns about crime, terrorism, and the 
economic burden that refugees posed were raised.81 However, immediate policy reactions 
to the crisis did not work to deter or exclude refugees based on these fears and 
challenges, but accepted their presence and worked to establish them within Swedish 
society as soon as possible. 
 
IV. Policy Reactions to the Syrian Crisis 
 Rather than enact legislation to limit the number of asylum-seekers that could 
resettle in the country or scale back their social welfare programs to render the country 
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less attractive to asylum-seekers, Sweden amplified their existing measures and launched 
new initiatives to deal with the Syrian crisis. 82  
 As early as September 2013, the Swedish Migration Board had announced that 
asylum-seekers from Syria would be granted permanent residence to live and work in 
Sweden under the same conditions as native Swedes and be granted family reunification 
rights. The number of Syrian applicants tripled in the two months following the 
announcement, and the blanket residency offer extended until November 2015.83 84 By 
the end of 2013, the number of Syrian asylum-seekers in the country had more than 
doubled from 7,814 in 2012 to 16,317. The number drastically increased in 2014, with 
30,583 asylum applications, and again in 2015, when 51,338 applications were received 
from Syrian asylum-seekers alone.85 
 The decision to grant permanent residence to Syrian refugees, rather than a 
preliminary temporary residence, allowed the country to begin the integration process 
immediately. Mikael Ribbenvik, the deputy director-general of the Swedish Migration 
Board at the time, stated that the policy change was determined after an evaluation of the 
ongoing violence in Syria as well as a review of Sweden’s past policy responses to 
refugee flows from Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1990s.86 The country learned via the 
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1990s Bosnian crisis that early integration is key for refugees’ long-term success87, and 
Ribbenvik noted that permanent residence status, more so than temporary status, grants 
refugees long-term security in the country, providing them with more incentive to 
integrate into the culture and labor market.88 
 In addition to these measures, Sweden sought other ways to support the large 
wave of asylum-seekers arriving to the country. The country raised an additional 7 billion 
kronor (approximately $771.2 million) in municipal taxes to support asylum-seekers, 
made efforts to create more low-wage jobs for refugees, and began building temporary 
housing.89 In 2015, they submitted a request to the European Commission to reduce their 
contribution to the EU budget and allocate that money toward dealing with the refugee 
crisis.90  
 In September 2015, Swedish Prime Minister Stefan Löfven presented policy 
recommendations for the European Union’s refugee system, calling on all European 
countries to take more responsibility in receiving refugees.91 This signaled a coming shift 
in Swedish refugee policy, as Sweden began to observe the limits of their open-door 
policy. This shift, to be further detailed in Section VI, aligns with liberal universalist 
values as characterized by consequentialist universalism.  
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V. Swedish National Identity, the Welfare State, and Refugee Policy  
 Swedish cultural ideals and their collective national identity are integrated into 
and form the underlying principles of policy. This is notable in their overarching welfare 
state, which was established in the 1930s. Their welfare model is connected to the 
Swedish concept of folkhemmet, “the people’s home.” Folkhemmet in the context of the 
welfare state assures Swedes that the state considers equality and cooperation when 
enacting policy, inspiring confidence in state institutions on the part of the people.92 In 
essence, the Swedish welfare model rests on an optimistic belief – held by the state and 
by the population – in a continuous progress toward a better society.93 
 Largely the result of Sweden’s experience in the aftermath of World War II, the 
welfare state was idealized and transformed in the post-war period through the 1960s. 
The post-war Swedish experience of having been safe and prosperous while its European 
neighbors were weak helped further develop many of their modern moral and cultural 
values surrounding welfare and the duty of the state.94 A sense of an internationally 
focused national identity was cemented during this period. By aiding Western European 
countries in recovering from the war, Swedes came to see themselves as a social ‘great 
power’.95 Humanitarian action has since been organized from top-to-bottom.96  
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 That both domestic welfare and international humanitarian action are considered 
first and foremost the responsibility of the state, rather than that of private individuals and 
civic society, affects Swedish refugee integration policy. Swedish federal integration 
programs invest in each refugee by recognizing that refugees face particular challenges 
that native Swedes do not. The state takes an active role in subsidizing jobs for refugees, 
providing preparatory courses, searching for housing, and tailoring the job search 
experience to meet refugees’ individual needs by discussing expectations. Though the 
state is deeply involved in this process, refugees are still treated as native Swedes – they 
are expected to take their fair share of responsibility in employment efforts. 
Arbetsförmedlingen handles this process for native Swedes as well as refugees, rather 
than a migration board or municipal council specifically for refugees as is the case in 
Denmark.97 A guiding principle of international refugee law embedded within the 1951 
Convention and 1967 Protocol is that refugees enjoy the same treatment as receiving 
states’ citizens,98 and Sweden’s integration program is thorough in realizing this goal. 
 In post-war Sweden, “the war on poverty had been won” and the welfare of 
individuals in the state did not depend on the “charitable whims of the wealthy, on a 
humble and pious attitude on the part of the recipient, or on the persuasiveness of his 
pleas for help.”99 This aspect of the welfare state has also expanded to Sweden’s refugee 
policies. In the over two years that Syrians were universally granted permanent residency 
based solely upon their nationality, they did not necessarily have to meet the 1951 
Convention’s definition of ‘refugee’ as one who has a “well-founded fear of being 
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persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion”100. Rather, they were granted asylum because they were 
fleeing indiscriminate violence. The protection of the individual was not contingent upon 
how strong their individual claim of fear of persecution (“the persuasiveness of his 
pleas”) was, but rested on an assumption that Syrians, as a group, had a well-founded fear 
of indiscriminate violence, if not persecution. This extremely generous and inclusionary 
policy is far from the norm in Europe, where some states have taken the exact opposite 
approach by pursuing ‘zero refugee’ policies or siphoning refugees into squalid camps 
and detention centers.101 102 
 This low emphasis on the importance of nationality in seeking refuge reflects the 
national sentiment of Sweden – or rather, the lack thereof. There is not a traditional sense 
of nationalism or national heritage in Sweden103, and political culture has been “far less 
dominated by [Swedish] national history than most of the other countries of Europe.”104 
Among European countries, it has gone the farthest in defining itself as a multicultural 
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society105, and according to a 2016 Pew Research Center, Swedes are the least 
exclusionary when it comes to national identity. Of those surveyed, 45% state that having 
been born in the country is “not at all important” for being truly Swedish, and 34% stated 
that it was “not very important.”106 This ‘open-borders’ conception of national identity 
lends itself to their inclusive refugee policy, as it implies faith in the eventual social 
integration of refugees – you do not need to be born in Sweden to attain ‘Swedishness’. 
 Like other European countries, the majority of Swedes believe that sharing 
national customs and traditions is “very important” or “somewhat important” in being 
truly Swedish.107 While this could signal an unwillingness to accept those who are 
culturally dissimilar, 36% of those polled indicated that an increasingly diverse society 
makes the country a better place to live – the highest of any European country polled. 
Though another 26% believe that growing diversity makes the country a worse place to 
live,108 refugee policy in this area seeks to address and integrate refugees into national 
customs and traditions, with integration packages designed to address specific refugee 
needs and information on how to integrate into Swedish society. Specific tracks tailor 
information to refugees’ needs – helping inform refugees on Swedish customs and how 
refugees can best achieve their goals in a ‘Swedish’ way.109 
 Another aspect of national identity that impacts Swedish refugee policy is their 
secularism. The Swedes – like other Scandinavians – are not particularly religious. 
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Political culture is characterized by a low adherence to ‘traditional values’ and a high 
appreciation for ‘self-expression values’, primarily related to social trust, social activism, 
and tolerance for minorities.110 In 2003 surveys, Bondeson found that among 
Scandinavians, Swedes had the lowest rating of confidence in church institutions and 
were more accepting of religious minorities than other Scandinavian countries.111 112 
Surveys administered by the Pew Research Center in 2016 complement these findings; 
57% of Swedes believe that being a Christian is “not at all important” and 27% believe it 
is “not very important” to truly be Swedish.113  
 Liberal universalist values do not ascribe special importance to membership in 
any social group, including religion. Sweden’s religiously tolerant and secular national 
identity, complemented by their liberal universalist values, is conducive to enacting 
inclusionary refugee policy, as the vast majority of Syrian refugees coming to Sweden are 
Muslim. As Christianity is widely considered to be unimportant to assimilating into 
Swedish culture, Muslim refugees are less likely to be targeted as un-assimilable on 
account of their religion. Common interpretations of the challenge of Muslim integration 
portray a conflict between Muslim immigrant groups and native citizens of Christian-
heritage societies.114 Religiosity and Christianity have not been incorporated as an 
important aspect of Swedish national identity nor Swedish culture, thus Muslim refugees 
are not regarded as too culturally or religiously dissimilar to integrate.   
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 The Swedish perception of criminality also contributes to constructing a society 
that is more open to refugees. Swedes are more likely than other Nordic countries to 
commit a variety of illegal activities and are willing to let crimes go unpunished if they 
did not directly harm another individual.115 While Bondeson’s surveys found that Swedes 
believed “claiming state benefits which you are not entitled to” was the third least 
morally justifiable criminal behavior,116 the majority of Swedes reject the notion that 
refugees are a burden on the welfare state for taking jobs and social benefits – 62% 
believe that refugees will make the country stronger with their work and talents.117 While 
there is a widespread stereotype in Denmark of refugees as ‘freeloaders’ that drain the 
welfare state of resources, that stereotype appears to be less prevalent in Sweden.118 The 
Swedish belief that refugees with strengthen the country economically is complemented 
by research from Bruegel, a Belgian think tank, that found that skilled and unskilled 
migration can have a positive effect on a host country’s productivity. Bruegel notes that 
migrants’ skills must be matched by host economies’ needs, and that Arbetsförmedlingen 
is one of the most useful sources of information on migrant skills, integrating information 
on skills as part of their establishment program.119 
 Rather than constructing the intense attachment to nation and countrymen that 
resulted in occupied countries during the war, WWII shifted Swedish patriotism toward 
the idealization of material values, social services, and maintaining a high standard of 
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living.120 Organized top-down humanitarian action has since been commonplace and a 
source of national pride.121 Rather than centering ‘Swedishness,’ Swedish national 
identity is characterized by a role of conscience to the world, and an emphasis on 
humanitarian and moral responsibility to asylum-seekers and refugees is central to 
Sweden’s self-image as a state.122 This aspect of Swedish national identity in particular – 
a commitment to humanitarian action – incorporates liberal universalist values. The belief 
that non-nationals have an equal claim to rights as nationals and therefore providing 
assistance when non-nationals make rights claims is central to liberal universalism and is 
central to Swedish refugee policy and integration programs. Swedish national identity is 
characterized not only by liberal universalist values, but also by multiculturalist values 
that reject the notion of cultural incompatibility. Multiculturalist policies realize 
successful integration if diversity is celebrated and the government acknowledges 
minority cultures as having equal value to that of the mainstream culture.123 Sweden has 
defined itself as a multicultural society, relying less on a sense of national heritage based 
on shared history or culture to define their identity and more on shared values, such as 
humanitarian commitment, faith in the welfare state, folkhemmet, and civic participation. 
 
VI. Most Recent Responses  
 Following wide acceptance of refugees throughout 2015, Sweden was 
administratively overwhelmed with asylum requests and processing integration measures. 
Despite their comprehensive integration system, the sheer volume of refugees entering 
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the country became “untenable,” according to press releases from the Ministry of 
Justice.124 Between 2014 and 2015, for example, the process time for asylum applications 
increased from 140 to 250 days. Housing shortages postponed commencement of 
language and job training, placing extended strain on social welfare programs that 
support asylum-seekers prior to employment.125  The Swedish Civil Contingencies 
Agency reported in November that the refugee crisis had become a health and life risk to 
Swedes, as healthcare providers, the police, and civil servants could not keep up with 
requests.126 
 Following calls for the European Union and its Members to better manage and 
coordinate refugee resettlement, Sweden began to enact more exclusionary refugee 
policies. The government’s goal in scaling back refugee acceptance, according to the 
Ministry of Justice, was to “ensure a sustainable migration policy” in Sweden and the 
EU. Temporary measures were thus introduced to reduce the number of those seeking 
asylum. 
 In November 2015, the government first introduced temporary border controls 
and identification checks between public transport to Sweden from Denmark, and this 
decision has been extended several times to apply up until May 2017.127 The government 
ended the blanket permanent residence for Syrians in November 2015 as well.128 
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 Throughout 2016, the Swedish government made proposals for legislative 
changes that reintroduced temporary residence permits and limited family reunification 
rights – a significant source of migration to the country – in an attempt to reduce the 
amount of asylum-seekers flowing into the country.129 Additional changes ended 
assistance to those asylum-seekers whose applications had been denied and were non-
appealable.130  
 To compensate for their new restrictive proposals, the government emphasized 
that, though a shift from their previous inclusive policies, these measures were necessary 
in order to maintain the strength of Swedish introduction and integration programs for 
asylum-seekers. To continue offering generous reception benefits to refugees, the 
government had to reduce the number of asylum-seekers granted these benefits. The 
government advocated for burden sharing in the European Union and proposed measures 
to reform the introduction and integration programs to better serve asylum-seekers and 
administrators.131 Prime Minister Stefan Löfven spoke to the European Parliament in 
favor of an asylum system in which asylum is sought with the European Union, not 
individual Member States, and called for a “move from chaos to control.”132 
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 These changes indicate the presence of liberal universalist values in the country as 
tempered by consequentialist utilitarianism. While they could be interpreted as indicative 
of a nationalist turn in the country, the government has continued to offer their 
integration program to refugees and has framed the policy changes as reactions to an 
overburdened bureaucracy. Swedish diplomats feel strongly that Sweden should receive 
as many asylum-seekers as possible, but that to do so is no longer pragmatic. Sweden’s 
Prime Minister Stefan Löfven stated in a press conference that it pained him to enact 
exclusionary policies but that Sweden “simply [could not] do any more” to receive 
refugees. Deputy Prime Minister Åsa Romson was moved to tears when announcing the 
stricter rules regarding refugee acceptance.133  
 To continue accepting refugees would impede the distribution of benefits and 
services to accepted refugees and affect the quality of such services. In some cases, the 
burden on healthcare providers and the police – as noted by the Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency – could infringe on the quality of care that not only refugees 
receive, but that native Swedes receive.134 Owing to this, the Swedish government did not 
give any special moral relevance to nationality, as in nationalist value systems, but rather 
considered the impact of their open refugee policies on all participants in the welfare 
system – emblematic of consequentialist utilitarianism. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 Initial policy reactions to the Syrian crisis in Sweden – expanding services, 
raising taxes to support the newcomers, and granting blanket protections to Syrians in 
particular – were characterized by liberal universalism, doing what was necessary to treat 
refugees the same as native Swedes, without nationals as more deserving of state benefits 
than non-nationals. The aspects of national identity that impact welfare policy impact 
refugee policy as well, with liberal universalist values encouraging the extension of the 
welfare state to benefit non-nationals as well. 
 When faced with challenges to the system and the ability of the welfare state to 
protect all those that the Swedish state endeavored to, the government was forced to 
rescind some of its generous provisions, particularly concerning granting permanent 
residence to Syrians. While these legislative changes were, in effect, exclusionary toward 
refugees, the statements made by government agencies and representatives reflect a 
continued commitment to bettering the situation for refugees in Sweden. The government 
maintained their dedication to liberal universalism, but recognized that this was not a 










Chapter Four – Denmark 
I. Introduction 
 In contrast to Sweden’s response, Denmark has enacted exclusionary policies 
toward refugees following the Syrian refugee crisis. This chapter provides a background 
on Danish refugee policy and frames it within Danish national identity and nationalism, 
which has seen significant growth in the country since 2001. Sections II, III, and IV detail 
the history, background, and policy changes that followed the Syrian crisis reaching 
Denmark. Section V describes the immediate policy reactions in terms of Danish national 
identity and nationalism. The chapter details the ways in which Danish national identity 
has affected refugee policy, serving as the second case study in the thesis. 
  
II. History of Danish Refugee Policy 
 Denmark has a long tradition of participation in international refugee protection. 
It was the first country to ratify the 1951 Convention and one of the first to implement 
both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol via the Danish Aliens Act.135 In 2013, 
Denmark received the seventh highest amount of asylum-seekers per capita among the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries136 and their Danish 
Refugee Council, a humanitarian group funded by the Danish government, is a prominent 
actor in supporting refugees globally.137 The country is a generous actor in administering 
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global aid– one of only four of the OECD countries, along with Sweden, that donates 
more than the target .7% of their national income on foreign aid.138 Denmark has long 
prided itself on its commitment to humanitarian aid and openness to refugees in their 
egalitarian society.139 
 The country’s resettlement program was established in 1979 and has worked with 
the UNHCR in resettling refugees in the country, approving an annual allocation of 
resettlement places to refugees. From July 2005 until December 2016, Denmark operated 
a flexible quota program, resettling 500 refugees annually.140  
 Two central acts constitute the foundation for Danish immigration and integration 
– the Aliens Act and the Integration Act. Denmark has historically provided 
comprehensive integration services and support for refugees, whose status is defined in 
the Aliens Act and whose entitlements outlined in the Integration Act.141 Beginning with 
a pre-departure orientation, the Danish Immigration Service has provided language and 
culture classes to refugees, and then delegated integration services to the municipalities 
where the refugees were to be resettled.142 The municipalities are tasked with 
resettlement in order to ensure that refugees are evenly dispersed throughout the country,  
avoiding de facto segregation. Refugees are offered an integration program, under the 
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1999 Integration Act, that lasts three years and includes housing, Danish language 
classes, courses on Danish society and employment or education advice. Until refugees 
are employed, the government’s Danish Social Services provides them cash benefits – 
contingent on the refugee’s continued involvement in the integration program.143 Since 
July 2013, the municipalities have been responsible for providing refugees with 
preliminary physical and mental health services, employment and education services.144 
 Expedient integration is seen as essential to maintaining cultural homogeneity and 
social egalitarianism.145 Successful integration is measured by educational performance 
and labor market integration and economic self-reliance, along with language acquisition 
and active participation in Danish society.146 The hallmark of successful integration is 
one of successful inclusion in and acculturation to Danish culture and traditions, 
especially their egalitarian and secular values. 147 In the minds of Danes, this 
assimilationist approach guarantees moral order, social cohesion, and the continued 
success of their welfare state. The Danish reaction to the Syrian crisis, as detailed in 
Sections III and IV, aims to protect this order under the ‘threat’ of immigrants who may 
be uncomfortable with the Danish way of life and challenge it.148 
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III. Syrian Refugee Crisis in Denmark 
 The Syrian refugee crisis profoundly impacted the Danish asylum system. The 
number of asylum applications tripled from 2013 to 2015, with over 20,000 applications 
in 2015. Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan were the top three countries of origin, accounting 
for more than two thirds of the total applications. 149 Approximately 81% of the initial 
decisions on asylum in 2015 were positive150, and the country struggled to accommodate 
the needs of refugees in their welfare state, which guarantees free healthcare and 
education to every citizen.151 
 The influx did not only strain the country’s welfare system, but also raised 
tensions regarding social stability; the value placed on cultural homogeneity was tested 
when such a large population required extensive integration efforts. The Danish culture 
minister, Bertel Haarder, claimed that Muslims do not easily integrate because of their 
‘patriarchal culture,’ but there are also implicit parts of integration, such as norms 
regarding public speaking volume or jaywalking, that grate on Danish nerves.152 Danish 
history also left a legacy of national vulnerability,153 and refugees exacerbate this 
vulnerable feeling. The refugee crisis and the threat of terrorism are linked in the minds 
of Europeans154 and Muslims are widely perceived as a menace by host populations in 
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Christian-heritage societies.155 The fear that Muslim refugees from Syria, Iraq, and 
Afghanistan are not assimilable also prompted legislative changes to the Danish Aliens 
Act and Integration Act to limit access to the country. 
 
 
IV. Policy Reactions to the Syrian Crisis 
 The 2015 refugee crisis prompted a number of changes to Danish asylum laws 
and policies once the full impact of the influx began to be felt nationally.156 Legislative 
changes were implemented to not only limit the amount of asylum applications and make 
asylum seeking in Denmark more difficult, but also to deter refugees from applying in the 
first place.157  
 One of the first major legislative changes came in August 2015, when the Danish 
government cut refugee benefits by approximately 45%.158 Implemented that September, 
social assistance was lowered from a monthly 10,849 DKK (approx. $1,500) to 5,945 
DKK before tax for single adults with no children. This change applied to those who had 
resided in Denmark for less than seven of the previous eight years– targeting newly 
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arrived refugees as well as those who had been relatively recently resettled. 159  Aiming to 
encourage social cohesion, the legislation also provided a financial incentive to learn 
Danish, giving a 1,500 DKK increase to social benefits if the recipient passed a Danish 
language exam.160 The Ministry of Employment stated in a press release that these 
legislative changes were direct attempts to make Denmark less attractive to refugees and 
to incentivize already-resettled refugees to work and contribute to Danish society.161 
 These changes were widely criticized, and the UNCHR released a statement that 
the cuts were in violation of the 1951 Convention, which provides that signatories give 
refugees the same treatment as nationals when it comes to public relief services and 
social security services. Despite the Danish government’s claims that that these 
regulations would be equally applied to Danish nationals who have lived outside the EU, 
the UNHCR noted that refugees were disproportionately affected by the legislation.162 
 Following the benefits cuts, the Danish Ministry of Immigration, Integration and 
Housing placed advertisements in Lebanese newspapers to urge refugees to apply for 
asylum elsewhere, describing the August legislative changes. Lebanon has taken in more 
than one million Syrian refugees, many of whom hope to continue on to Europe, and the 
advertisements stressed that refugees who were not approved for asylum would be 
quickly removed from Denmark.163  
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 In November 2015, the government launched a 34-proposal package to change 
asylum regulations, and adopted one third of the regulations, allowing the easier return of 
rejected asylum applicants, loosening regulations on refugee housing, and granting new 
authority for the police to control foreigners’ entry and stay in Denmark.164 On the 20th of 
November, the Danish Parliament passed legislation that the police could detain asylum-
seekers whose applications had been denied, and that in exceptional cases no court order 
would be necessary in order to arrest aliens for 72 hours.165 
 That same month, the government announced it was indefinitely suspending its 
participation in the UNHCR quota-based resettlement program, which it had participated 
in since 1979. This program only resettled approximately 500 refugees a year – a 
relatively small number considering the 143,000 quota refugees the UNHCR was 
responsible for settling in 2016 alone.166 The program was postponed, according to 
Integration Minister Inger Støjberg, in order to allow Denmark time to cope 
“economically, culturally, and socially” with the large influx of 18,000 refugees in 2015, 
and allow municipalities to better assist the refugees they had already resettled.167 
Comparatively, 163,000 refugees sought asylum in Sweden that year.168 The Danish 
government later cut other forms of support to accepted refugees, demonstrating a lack of 
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commitment to better assistance and rather, a desire to deter other refugees from applying 
for asylum in Denmark. 
 In January 2016, Denmark reintroduced border controls on the German border 
with random identification checks. The number of asylum-seekers entering the country 
dropped from approximately 1,200 per week in November 2015 to only 640 in the first 
week of January, hitting a record low of 223 in the third week of January.169 
 Parliament also approved a second part of the November 2015 asylum package in 
January 2016, which proved controversial but moved forward nonetheless. The most 
controversial portion of the package was the amendment to the Danish Aliens Act that 
approved the search and seizure of refugees’ valuables worth more than 10,000 DKK 
(approx. $1,453), with exceptions for items of “sentimental value.”170 The amendments 
also extended the time requirement for resettled refugees to apply for family reunification 
rights - the applicant family member now has to have resided in Denmark for three years, 
when the law previously allowed refugees to apply for family reunification after only one 
year of residency.171 The amendment reduced state financial aid to refugees by another 
10%, increased the minimum time requirement for awarding permanent residency, and 
introduced a fee for applying for family reunification and a fee for converting temporary 
residence permits to permanent permits. Furthermore, the law reduced asylum-seekers’ 
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agency in finding housing, requiring that they live in special housing centers and were no 
longer permitted to find their own housing.172  
 Local municipalities also gained international attention for policies that were 
considered Islamophobic and targeting toward refugees. In January 2016, the city of 
Randers passed a proposal to require that pork be served on school lunch menus.173 
Proponents of the proposal said that pork was a traditional Danish food and was essential 
to preserving national identity, while critics claimed that it stigmatized and targeted 
Muslims. The proposal stated that pork must be served on “an equal footing” as other 
foods, though it does not obligate anyone to eat the pork served.174 Other municipalities 
have witnessed harsh backlash against offering girls-only swim classes – popular among 
Muslim women and girls. The city of Aarhus voted to end girls-only swimming lessons, 
claiming that they impede integration and uphold patriarchal beliefs about women’s 
separation.175 
 The legal crackdown on refugees has not only affected refugees themselves – the 
government has started charging native Danes with smuggling if they assist refugees 
travelling through Denmark en route to Sweden or Norway.176 Almost 300 Danes have 
been charged with smuggling refugees, in an apparent attempt to not only dissuade 
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volunteers from helping, but to also signal to refugees outside of Denmark that they will 
not easily receive help on their journey.177 
 
V. Danish National Identity, the Welfare State, and Refugee Policy 
 National identity runs deep and strong in Denmark, and according to Ostergard, 
the modern Danish state represents a rare case of “virtual identity between state, nation, 
and society”.178 Danes have a “tribe mentality” that is closed and values consensus and 
cultural homogeneity.179 According to Campbell, the perception of national vulnerability 
has had a profound impact on Danish national identity,180 and the perception of national 
vulnerability as a small state is resurging with an influx of refugees.  
 National identity in Denmark is in large part built around a shared Danish 
“historical heritage”181 and cooperation in their guiding social covenant – that in return 
for the universal welfare state and high benefits, there is an expectation that people will 
work hard and pay into the system.182 The Danish social welfare state was established via 
cooperation between the classes; Danes feel that the welfare state was built from below 
and thus feel closely integrated into the state. There have always been close ties between 
the state, voluntary associations, and the general population that compound this 
feeling.183 Struggles over the issue of immigration and refugee integration challenge the 
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welfare state – politicians and the media have elevated the issue of immigration to the 
forefront of national thinking, claiming that the influx of refugees has put undue stress on 
the welfare state.184 Over the past 60 years, the welfare state, more than anything else, is 
what has grounded the nation in the heart of the Danish people,185 and when faced with 
large immigrant influxes, Danes perceive a threat of sovereign erosion and a challenge to 
their politico-cultural framework. Immigration is perceived as putting the Danish model 
of combined egalitarian political participation and consensual trust in the state in 
jeopardy.186 
 This perception of sovereign erosion and national vulnerability is tied to the 
Danish history as an occupied nation during World War II, and immigration from 
Muslim-majority countries is often overtly compared to German occupation. In the 2001 
parliamentary elections, MP Søren Krarup of the right-wing Danish People’s Party (DPP) 
compared contestation of a Danish Muslim presence to resisting Nazism during the war, 
stated that the hijab is equivalent to the swastika, and that like Nazism, Islam must be 
fought off.187 Jesper Langballe, another DPP representative, claimed Islam was a “Pest 
Over Europe,” referencing a 1930s anti-Nazi, anti-communist Danish book.188 An MP 
from Denmark’s Liberal Party, Inge Dahl Sørenson, also claimed that “certain people 
pose a security risk solely because of their religion,” while MP Mogens Camre of The 
Progress Party explicitly stated “Muslims are just waiting for the right moment to kill 
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us.”189 Danes from various political parties perceive Muslim immigration as a threat to 
their national security and state stability, conceptualizing these immigrants and refugees 
as an occupying force.  
 In addition, the Muslim presence in Denmark dilutes their cultural homogeneity, 
to which the strong sense of national identity in Denmark is closely tied, as evidenced in 
their assimilationist integration policies for newcomers. The government and the public 
both believe that the continued success of the welfare state is contingent upon 
maintaining this cultural homogeneity.190  There is great pressure to ensure cultural, 
linguistic and political homogeneity in the state, as this homogeneity is, in the minds of 
Danes, linked to welfare, well being, and success.191 The vast numbers of culturally 
dissimilar Syrian refugees seeking asylum in the country have threatened this cultural 
homogeneity, though the country’s population is still majority native-born. Whereas with 
the refugee flows from Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon that characterized the 1990s, the numbers 
were moderate and the Danish integration and welfare system could accommodate them, 
the rapid influx of Syrians do not fit this model. This has resulted in a backlash against 
refugee flows from Syria and the rest of the Middle East.   
 Prior to this crisis, most immigrants came from other Western countries and 
refugee flows from developing countries were fairly small. The 1990s saw a rise in the 
arrivals of Middle Eastern refugees, but their presence was not fully felt until the end of 
the 1990s and 2000s, when their families began growing and diluting the valued cultural 
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homogeneity of Denmark.192 Unlike Swedish national identity, which does not regard 
ethnicity or place of birth as relevant to being truly ‘Swedish,’ Danish identity is firmly 
rooted in ancestry, language, and blood – belonging to the ethno-national Danish group 
as opposed to an ethnic minority.193 The “integration crisis” in Denmark is thus presented 
as the problem of Muslim and Middle Eastern immigrants, refugees, and citizens who 
insist on maintaining their culture, language, and attachments to their home countries. To 
maintain this identity is seen as a failure to embrace Danish and European values.194 
 In Denmark, ethnification – the process of identifying and ‘othering’ groups based 
on ethnicity or race, or constructing a perception of this ‘other’ – is reflected in their 
integration program. In the majority of policy documents, the main focus is on the 
immigrants’ or refugees’ alleged shortcomings, with less focus on the barriers that 
migrants face, such as discrimination.195 Of the Nordic countries, Denmark has the 
strongest ethnification component in their integration policies, ascribing negative 
characteristics based on stereotypical beliefs. According to Harsløf, the stronger the 
ethnification process is, the more punitive the introductory program will be, and this is 
evident in Denmark.196 This ethnification process’ prevalence in Denmark contributes to 
their exclusionary refugee policies, as Syrian refugees belong to a distinct ethnic group 
that is ascribed the stereotype of being more passive – in terms of finding work and 
integrating into society – than the rest of the population.197 
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 Like Swedes, Danes consider claiming state benefits to which one is not entitled 
to be the third least morally justifiable crime, yet Bondeson found in her surveys of 
Danes that they are far more condemning of illegal behavior. In addition, Danes 
demanded harsher punishments for criminal behavior.198 Refugees in Denmark are 
routinely branded as ‘welfare scroungers’ or ‘refugees of convenience’ – only coming to 
the country to benefit from the welfare state, and not based on any real well-founded fear 
of persecution. They are seen as unfairly taking advantage of a system that was not 
intended for their benefit, but for the benefit of native/ethnic Danes.199 This perception of 
refugees as claiming benefits they are not entitled to lends itself to the creation of 
exclusionary refugee policy, as the perception of refugees as ‘welfare scroungers’ exists 
regardless of whether they are within the territory or not, and this crime is believed to be 
one of the least justifiable crimes within Denmark. Thus, exclusionary refugee policy 
deters refugees from entering the territory and makes it difficult for them to access their 
‘undeserved’ benefits once they are there. 
 Denmark’s strong sense of national identity, paired with their relatively 
homogeneous population and only moderate immigration flows until recently,200 has 
resulted in a nationalist refugee policy backlash, following a trend of growing 
nationalism in the country since 2001. Danish national identity does not regularly surface 
in such bold forms unless criticized or threatened by foreigners who find fault with 
anything ‘Danish’.201 As Denmark negotiates the transition from being a culturally and 
ethnically homogeneous society to one with significant proportions of ethnic minorities, 
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there has been a wave of nationalist discourse that positions immigrants and refugees as 
outsiders.202 This discourse has been exacerbated by the conflicts and violence 
surrounding a Danish’s newspaper’s solicitation of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad 
in 2005 and the 2015 Paris Hebdo shooting – flashpoints in Danish debates about 
preserving freedoms and the value of their cultural homogeneity,203 perceived as a 
safeguard against these forms of violence. 
 A key theme of parliamentary and local government elections since 2001 has been 
immigrants and refugees, and the issue has remained at the forefront of Danish political 
life as voters across the political spectrum suspend their traditional preferences and vote 
for right-wing parties with nationalist agendas.204 Contemporary Danish nationalism has 
centered on the redefinition of a Danish nation consisting of people who rightfully defend 
themselves from those from non-Western countries, particularly Muslims.205 
   
VI. Conclusion 
 Denmark’s policy reaction to the Syrian refugee crisis has been to turn further 
inward, cutting benefits to refugees and accepting less asylum-seekers. Not only do these 
measures serve to harshen the environment for refugees within Denmark, they are also 
clear signals to would-be asylum-seekers outside of Denmark that it would not be 
hospitable towards them. These deterrence mechanisms prioritize the rights of ethnic 
Danes to access the welfare state benefits over the rights of non-nationals to access these 
benefits. Even if accepted into Danish society, asylum-seekers still must wait and ‘earn’ 
                                                
202 Jaffe-Walter, Coercive Concern, 13. 
203 Ibid., 13. 
204 Gingrich, Neo-Nationalism in Europe and Beyond, 92 
205 Ibid., 93 
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these benefits. These policy reactions that actively discourage refugees from seeking 
asylum in the country reflect nationalist values – Danish citizens are the preferred 
recipients of Danish welfare benefits. Rather than adjust or expand the system to better 
accommodate refugees’ needs, the Danish government has enacted nationalist value-
motivated policies that restrict the ability of non-Danes to access the system and thereby 








 The previous chapters have described liberal universalist and nationalist values 
and explored these values in the context of Swedish and Danish refugee policies. Swedish 
initial reactions to the crisis were more inclusionary, while Denmark’s were more 
exclusionary. The following section will more thoroughly compare the two policy 
reactions and finalize the argument that Sweden’s refugee policy is impacted by a 
national identity that values liberal universalism, and that Denmark’s national identity 
prioritizes nationalist values which are then reflected in their refugee policy. 
  
II. Comparing the Cases 
 In both countries, national identity affects Swedish and Danish welfare and 
refugee policies. The cultural ideals that underpin the welfare state in both are used to 
justify refugee policy, but it is the difference between the two in prioritizing liberal 
universalist or nationalist values that result in divergent refugee policies.  
 On the one hand, Swedish national identity has incorporated liberal universalism, 
which does not value the rights of nationals over non-nationals and thus serves as 
justification for their inclusionary refugee policy. Their national pride is affirmed by 
meeting humanitarian goals, such as welcoming and successfully integrating refugees. 
The Swedish iteration of national identity does not value ties to the national history or 
cultural heritage, but rather relies on a commitment to Swedish moral values, which can 
be appreciated by anyone, regardless of origin. These values include the aforementioned 
humanitarian commitments, but also include faith in the welfare state and civic 
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participation. In this way, refugees can acquire ‘Swedishness,’ which is not perceived to 
be the case in Denmark. Liberal universalism in the Swedish case implies an extension of 
the welfare state to non-nationals and inspires inclusionary refugee policy. 
 Denmark, on the other hand, incorporates nationalist values into policy and 
Danes do not thus feel a sense of duty to non-nationals as they do to nationals. The influx 
of culturally dissimilar refugees has been perceived as a threat to the national ideals that 
form the foundation of their welfare state – particularly cultural homogeneity – and thus 
as something that must be pushed back against. This sense of national vulnerability and 
combined with a high sense of duty to protect the rights of nationals rather than non-
nationals has resulted in exclusionary policies that aim to ensure that the Danish welfare 
state remains stable for native Danes. When the welfare state is perceived as threatened in 
this way, nationalist values influence a turn inwards and enactment of exclusionary 
refugee policy to protect the system’s stability. 
 While Sweden’s more recent turn toward exclusionary policies could be 
interpreted as a nationalist reaction in line with Denmark’s initial policy changes, the 
hesitance with which Sweden has approached the changes and the way they have framed 
them indicates differently. Rather than discussing refugees as a security threat or 
inassimilable, as is the case in Denmark, the Swedish government has lobbied for other 
European Union Member States to accept more refugees, as their systems are 
overwhelmed. To accept more refugees would not be in line with liberal universalism, as 
the already-accepted refugees as well as native Swedes would actually suffer as the 
system becomes too administratively burdened. Consequentialist utilitarianism thus 
tempers their liberal universalist inclination, protecting the rights of native Swedes as 
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well as already-present refugees by providing that their claims to rights are equal to those 
claims from outsiders, but not less important. If to accept more refugees would impede 
the quality of services that those already in Sweden enjoy, then the number that Sweden 
takes in must be stemmed. 
 This is contrasted by the Danish case, whose restrictions are not motivated by a 
dedication to ensuring that both nationals and approved non-nationals have access to the 
welfare state. Nationalist sentiment in Denmark prioritizes only the rights of nationals, 
particularly ethnic Danes, and thus excludes refugees from accessing a system that was 
not intended for their benefit. Non-Danes do not have a valid moral claim to Danish 
welfare state benefits, according to nationalist values. Culturally dissimilar refugees are 
not believed to be able to attain ‘Danishness’ because ‘Danishness’ is tied to a national 
heritage, language, and the creation of welfare system in itself that refugees have not had 
a role in. 
   
III. Concluding Remarks 
 In reaction the Syrian refugee crisis, Sweden and Denmark have altered their 
refugee policies in drastically different ways, diverging after sharing long histories as 
prominent humanitarian actors on refugee issues. Several factors of national identity 
impact welfare policy and refugee policy in both countries, but a moral distinction 
between the two regarding who is entitled to access the welfare state has resulted in 
differing refugee policy reactions. Sweden’s much more inclusive policies have reflected 
liberal universalism as a factor in their national identify, justifying expanding the welfare 
state to include as many as possible and benefitting non-nationals in ways similar to 
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nationals. Danish policy reactions have contrastingly prioritized the rights of native 
Danes to access the welfare state, reflecting nationalist values.  
 After identifying these policy differences, the preceding chapters have aimed to 
explore Swedish and Danish national identities and the ways in which differing policy 
reactions are affected by national identity. The two countries’ national identities vary in 
what they prioritize as important to national sentiment and how ‘Swedishness’ versus 
‘Danishness’ can be attained. Further, there is a moral distinction between the two in how 
they prioritize the attainment of ‘Swedishness’ versus ‘Danishness’ as a prerequisite for 
receiving state benefits.  
 An explanation of this moral distinction is valuable in truly understanding the 
motivations and justifications for refugee policies in Sweden and Denmark. This 
understanding can be extended to policy outside of these two countries, as national 
identity among all European Union Member States experiencing the current refugee crisis 
also likely plays a role in creating refugee policy. Identifying the similarities and 
differences in policy is useful, but it is particularly useful to understand why states seek 
different solutions to similar challenges. Refugee flows from Syria are expected to 
continue as the conflict enters its seventh year206, and more general refugee flows will 
continue until global solutions to the causal factors behind forced migration are 
universally reached. Thus, the national-level implications of these flows will remain 
relevant. 
                                                
206 Samer Abboud, “Syrian conflict does not end here,” AlJazeera, March 15, 2016, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/03/syrian-conflict-160315072807168.html. 
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 The existing literature on migration and refugees is heavily focused on these 
causal factors and their international political solutions,207 but wider research can benefit 
from closer analysis of national moral frameworks and policymaking. The policies that 
individual states enact have profound effects on the wellbeing and success of refugees in 
the integration process, as well as on the native citizens and host governments. This 
thesis’ analysis of the Swedish and Danish integration programs and their cultural roots 
therefore fills a knowledge gap that is significant for the broader literature on migration 
and refugees. 
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